that many of her relatives still were living in Aleppo. Having made her escape in safety, she reached Ras al-Ain, from where by our agent she was sent to us.3 A notation on the next page explains that Zabel was later placed with relatives. The other histories echo her story with unremitting consistency: the children and young people arriving in Aleppo told of deportations, separations, mass extrajudicial kill ings, and repeated rapes, followed by years of unpaid servitude as agricultural work ers or domestic servants, servile concubines, unconsenting wives, and involuntary mothers.4 Beyond capturing the raw horror faced by some of the Genocide s youngest sur vivors, each of those histories is a reminder that the collapse of the Ottoman Empire was accompanied by a humanitarian disaster of world-historical proportions. From 1914 to 1923, a quarter of the empire's population perished from famine, disease, and state violence.5 The war and its aftermath created unprecedented numbers of displaced persons: Turkish refugees fled advancing armies in the Balkans and the Caucasus; Ottoman Armenians who had survived deportation to Mesopotamia filled camps and shantytowns scattered along the outskirts of the major cities of the Levant.
Postwar diplomacy, which left the empire fragmented and under foreign occu pation, contributed to that disaster. Under the terms of the Treaty of Sèvres (1920) , much of Ottoman territory was divided among the victorious Allies, and what was left was placed under strict military and economic control. Parts of Southern Ana tolia, Syria, and Lebanon were put in the hands of the French. The British took control of Palestine, Trans-Jordan, and Iraq. Greece seized Thrace and expressed ambitions to add much of Western Anatolia to its territory. The Allies jointly oc Mediterranean.7 It viewed repairing the damage that the war had inflicted on select populations as one of its chief humanitarian obligations and imagined itself a pre eminent agent of change, bringing peace and security to the region through a moral and political reordering along modern liberal nationalist, Wilsonian lines.8 The
League's efforts on behalf of deported and displaced Armenian women and children, known collectively as the Rescue Movement, were considered crucial to the fulfill ment of these aspirations. The records of various committees and subcommittees of the League of Nations, correspondence and supporting materials submitted by the League's relief workers in the field, communications with the Ottoman state, and memoirs and histories by Turks, Armenians, and Arabs can help to illustrate the complicated and often par adoxical historical experience of the Rescue Movement as it was conceived and im plemented by the League in the interwar Eastern Mediterranean. They show that the rescuing of Genocide survivors such as Zabel-a seemingly unambiguous goodwas at once a critical moment in the definition of modern international humani tarianism and human rights and a site of resistance to the colonial presence in the post-Ottoman Eastern Mediterranean, a presence that was often defended in the language of progress and civilization. Rescue would also play a role in binding the international community to Armenian communal survival, serve as an ex post facto warrant for the First World War, and threaten, nonetheless, late Ottoman ethnic, 7 For a discussion of renewed scholarly interest in the League of Nations, see Susan Pedersen, "Review Essay: Back to the League of Nations," American Historical Review 112, no. 4 (October 2007): 1091-1117. 8 Recent scholarship on Wilsonianism includes Erez Manela's provocative The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism (Oxford, 2007) . religious, and gendered hierarchies and the unalloyed dominance of post-Ottoman society by Turkish-and Arabic-speaking Sunni Muslims.
Moreover, the League's rescue efforts confirm how the theory and practice of international humanitarianism had changed by the early decades of the twentieth century. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, humanitarians had sought to alleviate the suffering of others, which could mean early death, starvation, forms of exploitation, and disease. Motivated by an ethic of sympathy and sustained by the sentimental narrative, this early humanitarianism was often made an instrument for religious conversion, especially to forms of Protestant Christianity.9 Early human itarianism was embedded in religiously driven and episodic forms of missionary ac tivity, in abolition, and in attempts to regulate the treatment of soldiers during Eu rope-based conflicts, the chief example being the founding of the International Committee of the Red Cross in 1863.10 In the context of British, French, and Amer ican colonialism, it featured in the "White Man's Burden" and the mission civilisa trice, and it was at the core of the military and diplomatic concept of "humanitarian intervention," which, as Samuel Moyn has observed, "often exported to foreign lands the savagery it purported to be banishing from them."11
While still possessing elements of its predecessor, modern international human itarianism, as embodied by the League, was envisioned by its participants and pro tagonists as a permanent, transnational, institutional, and secular regime for un derstanding and addressing the root causes of human suffering.12 It paralleled the evolution of philanthropy, and was distinct in its reliance on social scientific knowl edge-based approaches to the management of humanitarian problems-expanding late-nineteenth-century notions of "scientific philanthropy" on a massive scale.13 The 9 Craig Calhoun, "The Imperative to Reduce Suffering: Charity, Progress and Emergencies in the Field of Humanitarian Action," in Michael Barnett and Thomas G. Weiss, eds., Humanitarianism in Question: Politics, Power, Ethics (Ithaca, N.Y., 2008), 73-97, 78-79. 10 Western Christian missionary hospitals and schools had been operating in the Eastern Mediter ranean since the 1840s. However, that work was generally inscribed in the interstices of the various Christian communities of the Ottoman Empire. Late-nineteenth-and early-twentieth-century mission aries tended to view non-Western forms of Christianity, including Armenian Apostolic Christianity, as nominally Christian, often insisting on the conversion of native Christians to Protestantism. The entire enterprise was imbued with a distinctly American and European cultural chauvinism. For recent dis cussions of the ideological and cultural content of missionary work in the nineteenth-century Arab Middle East, see Ussama Makdisi, Artillery of Heaven: American Missionaries and the Failed Conversion of the Middle East (Ithaca, N.Y., 2008) ; and Heather J. Sharkey, American Evangelicals in Egypt: Mis sionary Encounters in an Age of Empire (Princeton, N.J., 2008) .
11 "Although hardly a new idea in the fin-de-siècle, the civilizing mission acquired greater currency in the age of democratic empire; ruling elites in France sought to reconcile themselves and the recently enfranchised masses to intensified overseas conquest by claiming that the newly restored republic, unlike part played by Western civil society and publics-and modern forms oí advertis ing-in underwriting and agitating on behalf of humanitarian projects also distin guished this turn.14 Further defining it was the emergence of a new and to some extent gendered practice, professional relief work, exemplified by the Western mid dle-class female relief worker. Indeed, at the League, women, who had often par ticipated in nationally based social reform and peace movements, were channeled into working on issues of slavery, public health, and children, the so-called "Social Questions."15 This observation confirms that the general ambit of international hu manitarianism derived in no small part from elite Western feminists' work on behalf of women's rights, suffrage, and social welfare. Critical as well was its explicit con nection to international peacemaking as both a causative and a preventive measure and its alignment with another emerging concept, "collective security," in the raison d'être of the League of Nations.16 A final element of modern humanitarianism was the anticipation that the international community-itself a concept of recent ori gin-could and would take action on behalf of humanitarian concerns.
This connection between intention and action was predicated in the unique case of the Ottoman Empire and the greater Middle East by the outcome of the war and the occupation of the region. The fact of foreign occupation meant that certain kinds and categories of Western-originated humanitarian projects might now be feasible, certainly more so than in the antebellum Eastern Mediterranean, because of the parallel reduction in Ottoman sovereignty. The establishment of the interwar man date system in the Arab provinces of the empire extended and institutionalized that subordinate status, opening more possibilities for humanitarian action emanating from the West.17 Ironically, the most internationalist dimension of the League's larger efforts took place only in the shadow of interwar colonialism; the liberalizing and tutelary agenda of the mandate system created an unprecedented opportunity for the implementation of League initiatives less restrained by questions of national sovereignty because sovereignty itself was held in trust, as it were, by a colonial power and member state.18 In this sense, modern humanitarianism was in symbiosis with toncai Keview b¿, no. ¿ (January lys/): 352-363. The shift to the "scientific" management of human itarian crises or disasters accompanied the emergence of the social sciences in the second half of the nineteenth century. See Thomas L. Haskell, The Emergence of Professional Social Science: The American Social Science Association and the Nineteenth-Century Crisis of Authority (Baltimore, 2000 Nationalism, 1920 -1945 (Princeton, N.J., 1988 colonialism. However, this does not mean that humanitarianism should be dismissed as merely another facet of imperialism, cultural or otherwise. Rather, it speaks to the need to investigate the relationship between late colonialism and humanitari anism more thoroughly, including the tensions that arise at their intersection. In deed, the history of the Rescue Movement is a powerful tool for theorizing what happens when the question of human rights and humanitarianism becomes-or is understood to be-a disciplining tool of Western institutions and colonialist agen Similarly, the history of the reception of the Rescue Movement illustrates a crit ical tension (with considerable practical implications) at the core of modern hu manitarianism as it was implemented outside the West. Regardless of its specific content and changes with time, humanitarianism tends to be understood by its pro tagonists as a doctrine of universal validity in spite of its identifiable origins in West ern social and political movements.19 This tension takes on additional meaning in the project of finding and addressing the root causes of human suffering and in justice.20 The very notion of root causes anticipates a transformational social agenda, which again, like human suffering, draws definition from the human rights imaginary and cultural references of the diplomats, relief workers, agencies, and publics that constitute the international community. Inherent to that project is an impulse to overturn practices, laws, and hierarchies of ethnicity, religion, and gender in a man ner and to an extent that might not be universally shared by the broader society in which those causes have taken root.
Identifying root causes elicits a seemingly simple question: What constitutes hu man suffering? By the advent of the twentieth century, the conceptualization of hu man suffering had broadened to include social phenomena affecting entire groups or classes-slavery and the abuse of children and women being the crucial examples.
The Rescue Movement suggests that this broadening continued but was changing somewhat as the League attempted to add the concept of suffering to its mission to protect minorities and their rights in new nation-states.21 In this case, child transfer, involuntary marriage, servile concubinage, and compulsory conversion to Islam fell, along with mass extrajudicial killings, into an expanded category of suffering and simultaneously constituted a violation of cultural or "national" minority rights, where the victim was not just the individual but also the "nation" or "race." In other words, the rights, in this case, of the Armenian minority entered the orbit of hu manitarian discourse and justice claims alongside the suffering of individual Ar menian survivors and refugees. This would have profound implications for the in ternational reach of human rights law and jurisprudence, particularly in the formulation of the elements of the crime of genocide.22 Likewise, for the dominant Ottoman society, this had the not wholly unanticipated effect of transforming quasi legal or at least widely accepted forms of customary domestic and inter-communal practice into elements of human suffering.
Finally, from the perspective of the historiography of the Eastern Mediterranean, the Rescue Movement constituted a collision between early forms of human rights thinking, the rights of religious minorities, women, and children, in particular-and also European notions of ethnic, racial, and religious superiority-with late-nine teenth-and early-twentieth-century Ottoman-Islamic conceptions of domestic pa triarchy, property, and the social position of non-Muslims in Muslim society. Un derstood in this fashion, the reaction to it in places such as Aleppo and Istanbul sheds light on the degree to which Ottoman reform efforts of the previous century, which incorporated the extension of rights of equality and emancipation as part of larger modernization schema, had taken root within Ottoman society and could withstand the multiple and existential crises and widespread social and economic dislocation of the war years.
In taking this first step toward understanding the full richness of the Rescue Movement as a historical problem and the important role it had in the formulation of modern humanitarianism in the wake of the Great War, we can begin the process of bringing the Eastern Mediterranean-and its women and children-into the lit erature on the global history of humanitarianism. At the same time, we introduce the possibility that contemporary human rights thinking took place within the prac tice of humanitarianism in the interwar period and at the intersection of refugees, colonialism, and the non-West, refining thereby the prevailing narrative of the his tory of human rights, which places much of its emphasis on the post-World War II era, the international reaction to the Holocaust, and the founding of the United Nations.23 At the seventeenth plenary meeting of the League of Nations General Assembly, [1914] [1915] [1916] [1917] [1918] and required the empire to cooperate with the League of Nations in the recovery of displaced people and generally "repair so far as possible the wrongs inflicted on individuals in the course of the massacres perpetrated in Turkey during the war."25 The League's formation of the committee was also a re sponse to the agitation of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom and similar groups, which equated the cause of displaced women and children with the repatriation of male prisoners of war.26
The General Assembly had charged the Fifth Committee with collating the re ports by relief workers Karen Jeppe in Aleppo and W. A. Kennedy and Emma Cush man in Istanbul, and recommending remedial actions. Indeed, the committee's re port and supporting materials stand as one of the first and most comprehensive reckonings of the situation facing survivors of the Armenian Genocide. Although concentrated primarily in Eastern Anatolia, and constituting a significant religious and linguistic minority throughout the Ottoman Empire, Armenians had been woven into the fabric of Ottoman society as bureaucrats, intellectuals, artists, and busi nessmen. At the time of the Genocide-an Ottoman state program-entire villages and cities were emptied of their Armenian inhabitants; the women and children were transferred from the region, and the men were either killed at the outset or con scripted into forced labor battalions and executed sometime later. Many of the de ported were sent to Mesopotamia, where they were subjected to mass rape, star vation, and murder.27 Moreover, as Zabel had witnessed, the deportation caravans people would take children and young women-by force or after bribing their es corts-then deliver them to brothels and orphanages or integrate them into their households in a variety of capacities and at various levels of status. This style of integration was a common Eastern Mediterranean social practice.
However, the number of children and women affected by it during the Genocide was unprecedented. Among pastoralists, rural smallholders, and the landed elite, house holds often included an array of members, with some related to the patriarch by marriage or filiation alongside a collection of biologically unrelated servants and retainers who belonged, as it were, to the household. Their relationship to the house hold was one of dependence and included a set place in a gendered hierarchy. Dis placed persons without the support or protection of a natal group were situated at the very bottom.28 They had little recourse in cases of mistreatment and could be sold or transferred without their consent. Unrelated girls and boys in the house hold-regardless of religious or ethnic origin-were sexually available to senior males. Often the girls were considered attractive as wives, especially second wives, because they had no viable family to protect their interests or demand a bride-price, and any children born of these unions would belong to the father and his family. This was the kind of situation that Zabel had fled. Boys were more difficult to integrate and usually worked as shepherds or agricultural workers on the margins of the house holds.29
Women, girls, and boys taken by Ottoman officers and ranking soldiers were brought into the men's own households or were passed to state officials, who sent-or sold-them to elite and middle-class homes in the major cities of the em pire. This was consistent with a mid-nineteenth-century Ottoman policy of placing Muslim refugee girls and boys with elite Ottoman families as "foster children" (bes lemeler), a process known in Ottoman legal parlance as evlatlik.30 The widespread , 1922 , -1930 , , vol. 3, no. 1010 , , May 18, 1926 . Similarly, Fehmi, son of Terthagian, was taken by a Bedouin from a passing de portation caravan at Mardin and sold to a Christian Arab named Habib, who taught him the tailoring trade. Habib subsequently fell on hard times and gave Fehmi to a local Turkish family, who treated him poorly, causing him to flee to Aleppo. Ibid., vol. 2, no. 962, March 25, 1926, 508 . Dikranouhi, daughter of Panos, who entered the home at age sixteen in 1925, meaning that she had been six years old at the beginning of the Genocide, explained that her father had died while serving in the Ottoman army, and she was deported with her mother. On the road, a Kurd took them both and forced her mother into servile concubinage. When the mother later fell ill and died, Dikranouhi became a servant in the man's household. When she reached sexual maturity at the age of fourteen, he attempted to take her as a concubine, but she fled and was abducted by an Arab in a neighboring village, where she became an abused maidservant. Ibid., vol. 2, no. 820, September 18, 1925, 523. 30 On the besleme, see Nazan Maksudyan, "Foster-Daughter or Servant, Charity or Abuse: Beslemes in the Late Ottoman Empire," Journal of Historical Sociology 21, no. 4 (December 2008): 488-512.
Several of the narratives collected by the Neutral House, two of which appear later in this article, de scribe the experiences of children and women who fell into this other category. For a compelling de scription of the experience of a group of upper-and middle-class Armenian college graduates sold or kidnapped into elite Istanbul Muslim households, see Mabel Evelyn Elliott, Beginning Again at Ararat
The League of Nations' Rescue of Armenian Genocide Survivors 1325 nature of this practice and its extension to internally displaced children in the im mediate prewar period suggests that it came to be viewed as a natural privilege of the Ottoman middle and upper classes and a ready source of inexpensive labor and wives.31 However, any strictly materialist explanation can go only so tar in explaining the motives for large-scale child transfer. Indeed, transfer of children from the victims' group to the perpetrators' community is common in genocide, but why it takes place is less well understood.32 In this instance, the fact that this happened to the children of a community the Ottoman state had come to consider an internal enemy certainly adds a triumphalist dimension to the effacement of an entire generation of Arme nians through their absorption into a larger Muslim and Turkish society; for some, the women and children may even have been considered legitimate war booty, a sentiment captured by the phrase "remnants of the sword."33 Nevertheless, in both rural and urban settings, the women and children were caught in a legal gray area that afforded them little measure of protection beyond the goodwill of those who held them. Only by escaping and reaching a rescue home or similar institution could they alter their status.
Western humanitarians regarded the Armenian women and children sequestered in these ways as slaves, consistently describing their condition as slavery and citing not just the lack of wages, but also child marriage, forced religious conversion, and subjection to resale or forced transfer as constitutive of their enslavement. League relief workers contributed stories and photographs of rescued Armenian girls to the London-based periodical Slave Market News, and Jeppe, in particular, made anal ogies to the experience of American slavery described in Harriet Beecher Stowe's Uncle Tom's Cabin, not just to illustrate the conditions in which the Armenian cap tives were living, but also to locate her efforts on behalf of Armenians within a tradition of nineteenth-century movements for emancipation. She and her coun terparts in the Eastern Mediterranean and their interlocutors in the West often imagined themselves as inheritors of the abolitionist tradition.34 For the League relief workers, this accepted form of domestic practice was a clear violation of the (New York, 1924) , 24-28, in which Elliott, who was an American physician and the medical director of the American humanitarian organization Near East Relief, describes her meeting with a group of res cued women at a rehabilitation center established by the organization in 1920.
31 As waves of Caucasian Muslims took refuge in Anatolia as a consequence of Russian expansion into the Southern Caucasus circa 1864, the Ottoman state placed "unattached" Muslim girls with elite and middle-class Ottoman families in order to forestall their being sold by their refugee parents. Like the Armenian children during and after the Genocide, they belonged to the household, were generally employed as domestic help, and could be used as sexual objects. Ferhunde Özbay et al., "Adoption and , 1920-1947. basic human rights of the children and women; it was the most pernicious root cause of their suffering, despite the actual material reality of the conditions in which they may have lived. It confirmed both their corporate sense of how out of step Ottoman society was with modern legal and moral norms and why the League needed to ag gressively intervene on behalf of vulnerable populations and facilitate their reha bilitation. Equally objectionable were the forced conversions and marriages that ac companied the transfer of the women and children and the situation of "racial chaos" that this presented.35 At stake in the restoration of order was the prevention of any further mixing between "white" Armenians and "Asiatic" Turks; the creation of the "unnatural" unions with Armenian women and girls was an act of miscegenation that they found both offensive and contrary to the moral discipline of modernity. This last objection perhaps explains why there is no evidence to suggest that the League at the time extended any concern to Muslim women and children in the same or , 1919 , -1922 , (Albany, N.Y., 1973 the vice president of the International Council of Women-led to her appointment in 1921 as a League of Nations commissioner.
Jeppe s understanding of why these particular women and children should be found and rehabilitated reflected her background and her strong conviction that as a result of the war, modern social reform in the West would be exported to the Eastern Mediterranean.38 She expected that the modern humanitarianism embodied by the League would give it power as a moral agent of change and reverse the ca lamitous impact of the war on the Armenians as a people, and not just work to provide immediate aid. This reversal was a reaffirmation both of the human rights of Armenians and of her sense of the "human wrongness" of Islam and Muslims. Her optimism aside, she suspected that Armenians could never resettle among Muslims even with international assistance, and that a separate home should be found for them in the Caucasus or Brazil.39 For Jeppe, the process of rehabilitation, as she explained in her report and later supporting documentation, was not just an edu cational and training process, but rather the means by which the rescued would be turned back into, in her words, "human beings."40 The restoration of the Armenians transcended a traditional relief project and was rather an act of restoring the very humanity of those rescued, and by extension society, to a proper moral ordering:
The standard of civilization of the Armenians ... is on a higher level than that of those beings with whom the young people are forced to associate. Their race is far more developed, which will be most evident from the fact, that the Armenian nation never could sink to Jeppe's negative attitude toward Islam, which modified over time, was not unique among her contemporaries; however, her commitment to the national survival and development of Armenians was, and is, evidence of a departure in how she con ceptualized not just Armenians but also her role in their assistance. Indeed, her earlier career as a missionary educator anticipated the emergence of professional relief work as a form of practice. Her career also confirmed that the institutions of There were a large number of Armenian girls and their children living with Aleppines. The Aleppines had given them shelter from the very first moment they took refuge in Aleppo. They had gathered them from the desert and saw to their upkeep and cared for their children. Some took the legally mature girls as legal wives and adopted their children.44
For GhazzT, the origin of these women-whether they had been purchased during the deportations or thereafter, and the fact that they had entered into relationships with Muslim men as a consequence of their vulnerable status as refugees-was ir relevant, although he did acknowledge, "We do not rebuke the Armenian sect for wanting to return their children to their bosom, because this is what their racial traits directed them to do, yet we condemn them for the way that this prejudice aided violence and assaulted friendship."45 To illustrate that "assault," he related two sto ries. In the first, an unnamed Armenian refugee woman married to a Muslim man was located by her brother, who demanded that she return to her original husband, who at one time had been thought dead but was in fact alive. The Muslim man refused to release her, "as was his right under Islamic law." The police arrested the husband and sent the woman to the Rescue Home. Locked away in a rooftop room, she refused all food and drink. Upon being interrogated by an Armenian priest, she stated that if she was not allowed to return to her second husband, she would kill herself. Seeing her resolve, her Armenian family gave up and allowed her to return to her Muslim husband. "So she returned to their house, and she has stayed with him until today, having borne him many more children."46 More troubling for GhazzT than the seizure of Armenian children adopted by Muslims was that the legitimate children of local Muslims also risked being rescued.
One six-year-old boy was taken from his Aleppine Muslim family and placed with an Armenian man despite the testimony of the family's Muslim and Christian neigh bors that he was indeed their son. While this particular boy was eventually returned to his "true father," many other children remained with Armenians.47 Striking in Ghazzl's discussions of the Armenian refugees in Aleppo, and the Rescue Movement in particular, is that unlike much of the rest of his book, these particular passages on Armenians and the Rescue Movement lack specific places, names, and dates, and resemble rumors more than historical events and court cases. It is worth noting that GhazzT, a jurist, did not reflect upon the fact that in the first case, the reappearance of the Armenian husband would have rendered the second marriage invalid, because the wife's first marriage had never been legally dissolved. Polyandry is equally illegal under Islamic and Armenian canon law. Instead, he asserts in both instances the patriarchal rights of the Muslim man as an absolute and as superior to any other legal or ethical consideration. Regardless, the underlying sentiment is clear: from Ghazzl's viewpoint, while the multiplicity of agencies or institutions involved in the rescue efforts seemed quite opaque, he did recognize the movement as a serious intervention in established norms of social interaction and hierarchy. For him, rescue was an unjustified and outright illegal intervention in the domestic sphere; but it was also unnatural, in that it upset the moral order on behalf of previously subordinate elements of society-non-Muslim women and children. He viewed these acts of res cue as an unprecedented, unwarranted, and illegal interference in a Muslim man's home, his harim, and a violation of his patriarchal and property rights. His writing about postwar society emphasized similar problems of moral decline, including al terations to the domestic sphere and Muslim/non-Muslim relations. Certainly, how ever, his conception of "family" and "household," in which clear categories of slave, free, children, and property were blurred, was at odds with the notions of eman cipation and bourgeois domesticity championed by Western humanitarians.48
The Fifth Committee's investigations focused as well on the work of a rescue home in Istanbul, the Neutral House. As indicated by the report, the situation in Istanbul presented challenges similar to those in Aleppo and Mesopotamia. With general lawlessness throughout the countryside, culminating in the post-World War I war for Anatolia, waves of refugees, including displaced orphans, flowed into the Ottoman capital. In their role as League commissioners, Emma Cushman, an Amer ican nurse, and W. A. Kennedy, an Anglo-Irish medical doctor, had gained access to registries of Ottoman state orphanages, in which they noted that names of Chris tian children had been overwritten with Muslim names. They concluded that about 50 percent of all the orphans in the city (5,000) were Armenian in origin, with another 6,000 in other parts of Allied-occupied Anatolia.49 Moreover, the commissioners accepted as reliable a figure of 60,000 provided by the Armenian Patriarchate as the number of Armenian children still held in Ottoman orphanages and Muslim homes. They also noted that innumerable women, mostly young, rudely torn from their hearths and homes, compelled to perform the most degrading tasks, are shut up in harems, into which it is almost impossible to penetrate."50 The committee had been especially frustrated in their efforts to gain access to the orphanages.
Oí the two commissioners, Cushman had the most extensive background in the region. She was typical of the middle-class female relief workers who emerged during the humanitarian turn of the interwar period. Originally from New York, she was trained as both a schoolteacher and a nurse. In the years before the First World War, she left her job as the superintendent of a Kansas City hospital to assume a leadership position at the American Hospital in the central Anatolian city of Konya. She refused to evacuate during the war, and as a consequence she became the acting consul in Anatolia for several countries. With the onset of the Greco-Turkish War in 1922, she oversaw the evacuation of some 22,000 Armenian and Greek orphans to Greece and Bulgaria. Unlike Jeppe, she seemed motivated less by any clear ideology than by general altruism and professional ambition. More important, engaging in relief work abroad placed her beyond the glass ceiling imposed on American professional women in the early twentieth century, and she was thereby able to achieve levels of responsibility that would have been unavailable to her had she remained in the , 1995) . She recounts in her memoir one case from the house. When a very pretty young woman was brought from a Turkish home, Bahri arranged to have her marry rather than be institutionalized. The future husband asked Bahri and his bride to keep her background a secret, even from his parents, presumably to conceal the shame of her rape and lost virginity. The lack of a larger body of Armenian language sources is due in no small part to how recounting the experience of enslavement, kidnapping, rape, and sequestration has tended to evoke a series of responses ranging from shame to outright denial in the Armenian diaspora; only recently have younger, particularly ethnic Armenian Turkish scholars, including Lerna Ekmekçioglu and Melissa Bilal, begun to address this history through archival and oral historical research. At the time, as Bahri's story indicates, there were clear practical reasons for concealment in social situations that placed a premium on modesty. It also signals how the rescued women and female children were caught between two patriarchal systems.
As the children often arrived without documentation, observers encouraged them to recall nursery rhymes, prayers, and folk songs in an effort to establish their or igin.54 Once their status was determined, the children were then returned to the care of their "community." Very few, if any, of the disputed children were ever deter mined to be Muslim. Claiming bias in the Neutral House's operations, the Red Cres cent's first representative, Naziye Hamm, resigned, as did her successor, Nakiye Hamm.55 Relief workers also documented the lives of those who were processed at the Neutral House. The cases recall Zabel's story and tell of rape, separation, and en slavement, but in contrast to the stories collected at Aleppo, the relief workers in Istanbul described how reluctant the children often were to admit their Armenian background. Cushman attributed that reticence to a combination of abuse and in centives at the hands of those holding them, noting.
With the girls, experience has taught me that this attitude of mind is usually brought about by gifts of clothing, personal adornments, such as beads, cheap jewelry, etc.; with the boys, it seems to be largely produced by fear, threats, blows, etc., until the child really believes that he is being protected by the Turks from a much worse fate.56
The registries at the Neutral House list a child's Muslim name first, followed in the text by his or her original name. The story of Ceman, also known as Verjine, is illustrative of the process that was used to make the determination: 10-11 years old. Brought from [a neighborhood in Istanbul]. .. [Sinan hoca sheyh Nurullah's] house. A very beautiful and charming girl, they have kept her.. . three days in a subterraneous den explaining to her that if she tell she is "Giavour" (Christian), the Armenians and the British will kill her. She kept silent under this terror for two days and confirmed that she knew nothing. By and by her terror passed she got used to us and began to relate that she was from Other entries describe more difficult situations. For example, in the case of eight year-old Nadiye, also known as Shevester, who was purchased by one Aci Badem Essad Pasha, Naziye Hamm produced a woman who had claimed to be the child's mother but then failed to recognize her. The girl was transferred to an Armenian orphanage. It was this case in particular that triggered Naziye's resignation as the Red Crescent representative.58
Like the Rescue Home's efforts in Aleppo, the Neutral House's program elicited strong resentment among Istanbul's elite, including Halide Edip Adivar, the leading Turkish feminist of her day, who was herself deeply involved in wartime relief efforts through her professional association with the Red Crescent and her personal as Progress, known in the West as the Young Turks.59 During the war, she briefly ad ministered an orphanage in Ayn Tura north of Beirut. In her own postwar memoirs, she noted that at the time she had expressed some reservations to Cemal Pasha, the military governor of Greater Syria, about the forced mass conversion of Armenian orphans to Islam. Her concerns about the situation in Istanbul were the reverse, however, and parallel Ghazzï's objections to the apparent illicit transformation of Muslim children into Armenians. Indeed, it is in her writings about the situation of children in the postwar empire that Edip's hatred and distrust of Armenians is most pronounced. Her writing has a texture similar to contemporary antisemitism in the way it elevates the Armenian to a mythical and existential enemy of the Ottomans, even to the point of borrowing tropes from blood libel and child cannibalism in describing a conspiracy to turn Turkish children into Armenians, thus also turning the accusations leveled against the Turks back toward the Armenians themselves. Hence she complains, "when the children were brought in large numbers from the orphanages of Anatolia they were sent to the Armenian church in Koum Kapou, a hot-pot which boiled the Turkish children and dished them out as Armenians." She concludes: "the children who were brought to the [Neutral House] were left in the care of the Armenian women, and these Armenian women, either by persuasion or threats or hypnotism, forced the Turkish children to learn by heart the name of an Armenian woman for their mother and the name of an Armenian man for their father."60 She offers no motive beyond fanaticism ("so far even the American mis sionaries could not go in their Christian zeal") and dismisses the assertion of the "Armenians"-and implicitly those of the League's representatives-to the contrary because "the Moslem Turks do not have the missionary instincts of the Christians of the West."61
As her discussion of the Neutral House's pernicious role in Istanbul concludes, Edip links it to a question of national survival. Relating the story of young Kâzim, as told to her by the last Red Crescent representative to the Neutral House, Nakiye Hamm, she explains how this young boy who had no papers was determined to be an Armenian despite being able to remember that his father was a Muslim. In pro test, as recalled by Nakiye, he had told the commission, "Kiazim is small, Kiazim is weak, his fists cannot protect him, but the time will come when Kiazim will be strong: then he will show the world that he is a Turk." For her, Kâzim's case was "a symbol of the helpless Turkish nation at the moment."62 Again, this rhetorical strategy of inversion-depicting the dominant group as the real victim-underscores her sense of how potentially threatening this humanitarian intervention was to the prevailing social order.
Edip's inversion takes on additional meaning in the face of a conclusion drawn in the report that she, alongside other leading Young Turks in conjunction with the Red Crescent Society, was involved in a program to place Armenian children with elite and middle-class Ottoman Muslim families in Istanbul. She herself had played 59 Halidé Edib Adivar, Memoirs of Halidé Edib (New York, 1926) . 60 Halidé Edib Adivar, The Turkish Ordeal: Being the Further Memoirs of Halidé Edib (New York, 1928), 17. 61 Ibid., 16. 62 Ibid., 18. some role in the history of the children being reclaimed by the Neutral House.63 Nevertheless, she may have viewed her actions as within the universe of humani tarianism, and/or possibly a form of charity in the way that boarding schools for American Indian children were once perceived in the United States. Indeed, during the Balkan Wars, the Red Crescent bore some responsibility for administering ev latlik placements of Muslim refugees and orphans.64 For her, as a committed na tionalist, seizing and placing Armenian children in Turkish homes was an attempt to erase national difference in a moment of extreme threat; the fact that the program pivoted on conversion to Islam as an elemental feature of being or becoming a Turk confirmed the relative importance of religion in her broader conceptualization of that identity. Left unacknowledged in her memoir, but on display in the reports on the reclaimed orphans, was that many were being held in the homes of Istanbul's military, political, and religious elite. These were people within her own social class and circle of acquaintance. The customary practice of that class to possess and exploit human beings from subordinate groups had come into plain view, casting doubt on the civility and modernity of Turkey and Turks. Her assertion of that modernity was a major theme of her work, and her reluctance to protect Armenians confirms that class and the persistence of Muslim privilege trumped relevant forms of cross-con fessional feminist solidarity. For Halide Edip, as for the Western relief workers, questions of social distinction and religion placed limits on the asserted universal nature of humanitarianism.
Combined, the work at the Neutral House and the Rescue Home and the reports collated in the field, not just at the established centers in Aleppo and Istanbul but also throughout Anatolia and Mesopotamia, led the League commissioners to con clude that sexual and domestic enslavement of women, girls, and boys was a wide spread consequence of the war. They also believed that the current Ottoman state was incapable of addressing the problem and that dominant society either ignored or explicitly sanctioned it.
The Fifth Committee's report asked the General Assembly to create a "mixed board"-Turkish (perhaps more correctly Muslim), Armenian, and Greek-to over see the "reclamation" of women and children and to open additional Neutral Houses in other parts of the empire.65 It was clear from the resolutions that the League anticipated a much more vigorous and intrusive inspection regime-backed by force of arms if necessary-that would allow unrestrained access to Muslim homes and Ottoman state institutions. Vacaresco followed the reading of the report with a speech in which she excoriated the Ottoman state in general and vilified the "Turk" in particular for the maltreatment of Armenian orphans, children, and young women. In an illustrative passage, she explained to the General Assembly, day doomed to fight in the ranks of their enemies, each one a new Oedipus trained to kill his parents with his own hands.66
The speech was interrupted several times by applause and was followed by a standing ovation.
Vacaresco's speech, the report, and other work by the League show the degree to which fixing the problems caused by the war and the Genocide was a moral im perative consistent with what the League regarded as its mandate. It is telling ev idence, as well, that the international community in the form of the League had concluded that the Turks-here both an ethnic designation and a code for Muslimswere implicated in an ongoing crime against humanity and that their collective re sponsibility had placed them beyond the pale of civilization. Or as Kennedy noted in the report to the League, "an entire people is an accomplice to this crime . . . Rape, violence, fraud, the force of inertia, bad faith-all are employed by men who man ifest a particularly odious form of fanaticism in carrying off women and children to captivity and degradation."67 This conclusion-that the entire Turkish nation, as imagined by the international community, was at fault-provided part of the un derlying justification for not rendering assistance to Muslim women and children in similar conditions. Indeed, the fact that the right to be rescued in practice applied specifically to Armenian and Greek (white/Christian) women and children confirms the contingent and circumscribed nature of allegedly universal human rights con ceptions at the moment.
The The whole Assembly of the League of Nations, that League of universal brotherhood, moved by Mademoiselle Vacaresco's lyrical talent applauded her expressions of hatred; and though it was far from accurately informed and far from possessing any knowledge of the East and its customs, it responded to this isolated challenge, and, without hearing the accused party or giving him an opportunity to defend himself, without weighing the significance of its action or measuring its consequences, it endorsed the judgment of the poetess, which slandered and cruelly attacked an honest and honourable people, which has been persecuted for centuries and always been vilified as the persecutor. Can such a procedure be called justice-a pro been offered an opportunity to return. 72 The following year's report noted that all of the women and children who had entered the Rescue Home that year had been smuggled across the Syrian-Turkish border, meaning that no additional survivors had been located in Syria itself. While about 75 percent of those who entered the home eventually found living relatives and left the facility, others remained, and Jeppe turned her focus toward using it as a center for training and rehabilitation. Her efforts mirrored those by the international community to create the institutional framework for resettling refugee populations rather than seeking to restore them to their ancestral homeland.73 An element common to both those opposing and those promoting rescue was the abstraction of women and children into nationalist, conservative, and humanitarian discourse, as empty vessels into which anxieties and beliefs about change, national honor, and civilization could be poured. Vacaresco's speech and Edip's memoir are perhaps the best examples of how this abstraction took shape. For the first, the treat ment of Armenian women and children achieved an elaborate symbolic value as an example of alleged Muslim depravity, the inherent guilt and backwardness of Turks, and the general moral disorder and chaos of the war; for the second, it was a brutal reminder of how low Turkey's fortunes had fallen-and in part at the hands of a disloyal internal "other." Indeed, the emblematic role of the virtuous Armenian woman as victim of the rapacious, terrible Turk and requiring rescue by the West was a leitmotif in the publicity and fundraising campaigns initiated by Near East Relief and other missionary and nongovernmental relief organizations during the war.74 Beyond the implications that this process has for the historian's efforts to recover women and children survivors as discrete historical actors, by infusing their rescue with this constitutive meaning, politicians and diplomats impeded the work of hu manitarians and the extension of direct humanitarian assistance to the very people who were most in need.75 The ideological and cultural meaning of rescue and the immense symbolic value of the women and children defined humanitarianism and the League's role in the Eastern Mediterranean as it underscored a loss of Turkish national prestige and Muslim social control and preeminence. The Ottoman reaction to the Fifth Committee's recommendations, which rejected not just the proposals but also the underlying facts, left no ideological or ethical space in which humanitarian 73 This shift was also a feature of League efforts at "population unmixing," and a manifestation of the conclusion that restoring refugees to their homes in formerly multiethnic empires contradicted the established policy of rationalizing nation-states. Weitz, "From the Vienna to the Paris System," 1338.
74 See Peter Balakian, The Burning Tigris: The Armenian Genocide and America's Response (New York, 2003) .
75 This process of emblematizing anticipates a phenomenon observed by Liisa Malkki in the way the international community treated Hutu refugees in 1970s Tanzania. For Malkki, bureaucratic human itarian intervention transformed the political and social categorization of the refugees in a profound manner that had far-ranging implications for their assistance. "Refugees stop being specific persons and become pure victims in general: universal man, universal woman, universal child . . . The problem is that the necessary delivery of relief... is accompanied by a host of other, unannounced social processes and practices that are dehistoricizing. This dehistoricizing universalism creates a context in which it is dif ficult for people in the refugee category to be approached as historical actors rather than simply as mute victims." Malkki, "Speechless Emissaries: Refugees, Humanitarianism, and Dehistoricization," Cultural Anthropology 11, no. 3 (August 1996): 377-404, 378. concerns and compassion would be overriding principles; consequently, few rescues or family reunifications were effected in the Republic of Turkey.
As the process of recovery in Anatolia ended, the Armenian children and women survivors who remained there assimilated. These gizli Ermeniler (hidden Armenians), as they are known in Turkey, started their own families and produced descendants.
Estimates of the number of contemporary Turks who have at least one Armenian grandparent range as high as two million, although the costs of revealing Armenian ancestry in public are potentially so high as to preclude the possibility of arriving at an accurate number. Excised from official Turkish history, this demographic reality has garnered increasing attention nonetheless, with discussions of Armenian heri tage having become interwoven with efforts at Armenian-Turkish reconciliation and official acknowledgment of the Armenian Genocide.76 76 See Ay §e Giil Altinay and Fethiye Çetin, eds., Torunlar [Grandchildren] (Istanbul, 2009) , for a collection of oral history memoirs of the grandchildren of "hidden Armenian" women. Çetin's 2004 memoir also tells about her discovery that her grandmother, whom she knew growing up as §eher, was born with the name Hranuysh and was a child survivor of the Genocide. Çetin retells §eher/Hranuysh's story in a way that is hauntingly reminiscent of Zabel's: after the men and older boys of her village of Hawa were executed, the women and children were sent on a march toward Mesopotamia. Among the horrors she witnessed en route was her grandmother drowning two of her infant grandchildren only to then fling herself into the water after them. Eventually §eher and the other girls in the caravan were separated and "adopted" by various officers, she by a Colonel Hiiseyin. Later she learned that her brother Khoren, renamed Ahmet, had been sold to a local farmer and worked as a shepherd. Their father, who had emigrated to America before the war, returned to Aleppo, where he located her mother. He sent word via smugglers to both of his children for them to join him. Khoren did, but Hranuysh, now named §eher and married to a local Turkish man, was unable to do so. Nevertheless, she maintained some contact with her family until the 1950s. A respected and beloved grandmother, §eher/Hranuysh practiced Armenian rituals, including the baking of a sweet bread, çorek, at Easter, which she shared with other former Armenian women in the village; she and other former Armenians never quite fully assimilated and maintained in forms of practice a memory of their origins. As an adult, Çetin renewed contacts with .
